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Abstract—This paper presents a novel coding scheme for
distributed storage systems containing nodes with adversarial
errors. The key challenge in such systems is the propagation
of erroneous data from a single corrupted node to the rest of
the system during a node repair process. This paper presents
a concatenated coding scheme which is based on two types of
codes: maximum rank distance (MRD) code as an outer code
and optimal repair maximal distance separable (MDS) array code
as an inner code. Given this, two different types of adversarial
errors are considered: the first type considers an adversary that
can replace the content of an affected node only once; while
the second attack-type considers an adversary that can pollute
data an unbounded number of times. This paper proves that
the proposed coding scheme attains a suitable upper bound
on resilience capacity for the first type of error. Further, the
paper presents mechanisms that combine this code with subspace
signatures to achieve error resilience for the second type of errors.
Finally, the paper concludes by presenting a construction based
on MRD codes for optimal locally repairable scalar codes that
can tolerate adversarial errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSS) are increasingly impor-
tant resources today for users and businesses than ever before.
Centralized storage is proving to be rapidly infeasible given
the growing sizes of databases being stored; as well as the
need to rapidly and reliably access them. Thus, generally, data
is distributed and often replicated across multiple locations
to enable ease-of-access and reslience to failures. However,
replication can be inefficient in terms of storage space, and
therefore, coding is useful in instilling resilience to node
failures while reducing storage requirements over replication.
Given the prevalence of single node failures in DSS (a user
exiting a P2P system, power outage in a single data center in
the cloud), coding enables a single node to be repaired as soon
as the node failure occurs in order to sustain the desired level
of redundancy in the system.
In order to repair the failed node, data is downloaded from
surviving nodes and a function of this data is stored as the
‘restored’ node. The amount of data downloaded in this repair
process is called the repair bandwidth of the reconstruction
process. Since large repair bandwidth translate to consumption
of a vast amount of system resources (in terms of bandwidth
and energy), it is desirable to have a coding schemes that have
as small a repair bandwidth as possible In [1], Dimakis et
al. establish an information theoretic lower bound on repair
bandwidth for (n, k) codes with maximum distance separable
(MDS) property (i.e., any set of k nodes can be used to
reconstruct the data stored on a DSS). The work also presents
a trade-off between repair bandwidth and the amount of data
stored on each node.
A desirable notion of repair is exact repair, where the
regenerated data is an exact replica of what was stored on the
failed node. The work in [2], [3], [4] present low rate codes,
which achieve the lower bound derived in [1] when data is
downloaded from all surviving nodes during node repair. In [5],
Rashmi et al. design exact-repairable codes, which allow node
repair to be performed by contacting d ≤ n−1 surviving nodes.
At the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point of operation
(see [1] for details), these codes also correspond to a low rate
regime as their rate is upper bounded by 12 +
1
2n . Recently,
various researchers have presented high(er) rate codes for
the MSR point which enable bandwidth-efficient exact repair.
Along a similar view, [6] presents codes for DSS with two
parity nodes. In [7] and [8], permutation-matrix based codes
are presented which are designed to achieve the bound on
repair bandwidth for repair of systematic nodes for all (n, k)
pairs. [9] further generalizes the idea of [8] to get MDS array
codes for DSS that allow optimal exact regeneration for parity
nodes as well.
While a bulk of existing literature in DSS addresses the
storage versus repair bandwidth trade-off, another important
issue that has recently received attention is the design of
storage schemes that ensure security and reliability of the
stored content against adversarial errors [10], [11], [12], [13];
and this issue of inducing reliability against adversarial errors
is the main focus of our paper. The dynamic nature of DSS
resulting from repeated node failures, triggering node repairs,
makes the problem of dealing with erroneous nodes non-trivial.
This is because a single corrupted node may subsequently
pollute other nodes in the DSS system during the node repair
process. In [12], Pawar et al. address the reliability issue
in detail and derive upper bounds on the amount of data
that can be stored on the system and reliably made available
to a data collector when bandwidth optimal node repair is
performed. [12] also presents coding strategies that achieve
the upper bound for a particular range of system parameters,
namely in the bandwidth-limited regime. A related but different
problem of securing stored data against passive eavesdroppers
is addressed in [12], [14].
In this paper, we study the notion of an omniscient adver-
sary1, which can observe all nodes and has full knowledge of
1In [13], Rashmi et al. show that product matrix codes [5] can be used
towards dealing with adversarial errors. This solution is again restricted to the
regime k ≤ n+1
2
, at the MSR point of operation.
the coding scheme employed by the system [12]. As in [12],
we assume an upper bound on the number of nodes that can
be controlled by such an omniscient adversary. We classify
adversarial attacks into two classes:
1) Static errors: an omniscient adversary replaces the con-
tent of an affected node with nonsensical information
only once. The affected node uses this same polluted
information during all subsequent repair and data col-
lection processes. Static errors represent a common type
of data corruption due to wear out of storage devices,
such as latent disk errors or other physical defects of
the storage media, where the data stored on a node is
permanently distorted.
2) Dynamic errors: an omniscient adversary may replace
the content of an affected node, each time the node
is asked for the data during data collection or repair
process. This kind of errors captures any malicious be-
haviour, hence is more difficult to manage in comparison
to static errors.
We present a novel concatenated coding scheme for DSS
which provides resilience against these two classes of attacks.
In our scheme, the content to be stored is first encoded using a
maximum rank distance (MRD) code. The output of this outer
code is further encoded using a maximum distance separable
(MDS) array code, which can be repaired in a bandwidth
efficient manner. Using an MRD code, which is an optimal
rank-metric code, allows us to quantify the errors introduced
in the system using their rank as opposed to their Hamming
weights. As stated before, the dynamic nature of the DSS
causes a large number of nodes to get polluted even by a single
erroneous node, as false information spreads from node repairs.
Thus, a single polluted node infects many others, resulting in
an error vector with a large Hamming weight. Using rank-
metric codes can help alleviate this problem as the error that
a data collector has to handle has a known rank, and can
therefore be corrected by an MRD code with a sufficient rank
distance. Using an (n, k) bandwidth efficient MDS array code
as inner code facilitates bandwidth efficient node repair in the
event of a single node failure and allows the data collector
to recover the original data from any subset of k storage
nodes. In this paper, we use exact-regenerating bandwidth
efficient codes operating at the minimum-storage regenerating
(MSR) point [1]. However, our construction works for any
regenerating code.
The proposed coding scheme is directly applicable to the
static error model and is optimal in terms of amount of data
that can be reliably stored on a DSS under static error model.
The model with dynamic errors is more complicated, as it
allows a single malicious node to change its pollution pattern,
and introduce an arbitrarily large error both in Hamming
weight and in rank. For dynamic error model, we propose two
solutions based on the concatenated coding scheme employed
for static error model. One solution is to exploit the inherent
redundancy in the encoded data due to outer code, i.e., an MRD
code, and perform error free node repair even in the presence
of adversarial nodes. This solution, namely naı¨ve method, is
optimal for a specific choice of parameters. Alternative solu-
tion combines our concatenated coding scheme with subspace
signature based cryptographic schemes to control the amount
(rank) of pollution (error) introduced by an adversarial node.
We employ the signature scheme by Zhao et al. [15], which
essentially reduces the dynamic error model to somewhat
similar to static error model, and helps us bound the rank of
error introduced by an adversarial node throughout its presence
in the system. Note that hash function based solutions has
previously been presented in the context of DSS to deal with
errors [10], [12]. While promising, these hash functions based
approaches provide only probabilistic guarantees for pollution
containment.
Recently a new line of work has appeared in the context of
DSS, which focuses on minimizing the number of surviving
nodes that contribute data during node repair (locality). In
[16], Gopalan et al. establish an upper bound on the minimum
distance of scalar linear codes that have locality r < k. They
further show the optimality of pyramid codes [18] with respect
to the upper bound, with locality of the systematic nodes.
[19] gives a similar bound for codes that have a more general
definition of locality. In [20], Papailiopoulos et al. generalize
the bound in [16] to vector codes (possibly nonlinear). In
this paper, we also show that MRD codes can be utilized
to construct optimal (in terms of minimum distance) locally
repairable scalar codes, which can tolerate adversarial errors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we first give a brief description of rank-metric codes along
with Gabidulin MRD codes and the error model in rank-metric
for these codes. Subsequently, we describe MDS array codes
and present two examples of bandwidth efficient MDS array
codes that are later used as inner codes in our construction. In
Section III, we describe the construction of our storage scheme
and prove its error resilience under the static error model.
Further, we present a few examples to illustrate our scheme
and show that our codes attain the upper bound on resilience
capability. In Section IV, we address the dynamic error model.
In Section V, we describe MRD codes based locally repairable
storage schemes. Finally, we conclude with Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Let M be the size of a file to be stored in a distributed
storage system with n nodes. All data symbols belong to a
finite field FQ of size Q. Each node contains α symbols. A
data collector reconstructs the original file by downloading the
data stored in any set of k out of n nodes. This property is
called an MDS property. When a node fails, its content can
be reconstructed by downloading β symbols from any d ≥ k
surviving nodes and stored in a new node added to DSS instead
of the failed node. The amount of data needed for a node repair,
denoted by γ = βd, is called the repair bandwidth. In [1],
Dimakis et al. show a trade-off between repair bandwidth γ
and the amount of data α stored on each node. Two families
of codes which attain two extremal points on the optimal
tradeoff curve are called minimum-storage regenerating (MSR)
codes and minimum-bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes,
respectively. In the sequel we will focuss on the MSR codes.
It was proved [1] that for MSR codes α and γ satisfy
(α, γ) =
(
M
k
,
Md
k(d− k + 1)
)
. (1)
B. Rank-Metric Codes
Rank-metric codes were introduced by Delsarte [21] and
rediscovered in [22], [23]. These codes have applications
in different fields, such as space-time coding [24], random
network coding [25], [26], and public key cryptosystems [27].
Our goal in this paper is to show that rank-metric codes are
useful for error correction in distributed storage as well.
Let Fq be the finite field of size q. For two N ×m matrices
A and B over Fq the rank distance is defined by
dR(A,B)
def
= rank(A−B) .
An [N ×m, ̺, δ] rank-metric code C is a linear code, whose
codewords are N × m matrices over Fq; they form a linear
subspace with dimension ̺ of FN×mq , and for each two distinct
codewords A and B, dR(A,B) ≥ δ. For an [N×m, ̺, δ] rank-
metric code C we have ̺ ≤ min{N(m−δ+1),m(N−δ+1)}
[21], [22], [23]. This bound, called Singleton bound for rank
metric, is achievable for all feasible parameters. The codes that
achieve this bound are called maximum rank distance (MRD)
codes.
1) Gabidulin MRD Codes: An important family of MRD
linear codes is presented by Gabidulin [22]. These codes can
be seen as the analogs of Reed-Solomon codes for rank metric.
Let m ≤ N . A codeword in an [N ×m, ̺, δ] rank-metric code
C can be represented by a vector c = [c1, c2, . . . , cm], where
ci ∈ FqN , since FqN can be viewed as an N -dimensional
vector space over Fq. Let gi ∈ FqN , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be
linearly independent over Fq. The generator matrix G of an
[N ×m, ̺, δ] Gabidulin MRD code is given by
G =


g1 g2 . . . gm
g
[1]
1 g
[1]
2 . . . g
[1]
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
g
[K−1]
1 g
[K−1]
2 . . . g
[K−1]
m

 ,
where K = m− δ + 1, ̺ = NK , and [i] = qi.
In the similar way as Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin
codes also have an equivalent interpretation as evaluation of
polynomials, however, for Gabidulin codes the special family
of polynomials, called linearized polynomials, is evaluated on
a set of linearly independent points over the base field Fq. A
linearized polynomial f(x) over FqN of q-degree n has the
form f(x) =
∑n
i=0 aix
qi
, where ai ∈ FqN , and an 6= 0. It is
easy to see that evaluation of a linearized polynomial is an Fq-
linear transformation from FqN to itself, i.e., for any α, β ∈ Fq
and a, b ∈ FqN , we have f(αa + βb) = αf(a) + βf(b) [28].
Therefore, a codeword in Gabidulin code C can be defined as
c = [f(g1), f(g2), . . . , f(gm)], where f(x) is the linearized
polynomial of q-degree K − 1 with coefficients given by
the information message, and g1, . . . , gm ∈ FqN are linearly
independent over Fq [22].
2) Rank Errors and Rank Erasures Correction: Let C ⊆
F
m
qN
be a Gabidulin MRD code with minimum distance δ. Let
c ∈ C be the transmitted codeword and let r = c+ etotal be
the received word. The code C can correct any vector error of
the form etotal = eerror + eerasure = (e1u1 + . . .+ etut) +
(r1v1 + . . . + rsvs) as long as 2t + s ≤ δ − 1. The first
part eerror is called a rank error of rank t, where ei ∈ FqN
are linearly independent over the base field Fq , unknown to
the decoder, and ui ∈ Fmq are linearly independent vectors of
length m, unknown to the decoder. The second part eerasure is
called a rank erasure, where ri ∈ FqN are linearly independent
over the base field Fq , unknown to the decoder, and vi ∈ Fmq
are linearly independent vectors of length m, and known to
the decoder. Note, that in the matrix form we can write
etotal = [e1 . . . et]


u1
.
.
.
ut

+ [r1 . . . rs]


v1
.
.
.
vs

 . (2)
[22], [29] present decoding algorithms for rank-metric codes.
C. MDS Array Codes for Distributed Storage
A linear array code C of dimensions α × n over Fq is
defined as a linear subspace of Fαnq . Its minimum distance
dmin is defined as the minimum Hamming distance over Fqα ,
when we consider the codewords of C as vectors of length
n over Fqα . An array code C is called an (n, k) maximum
distance separable (MDS) code if |C| = qαk, where k =
n − dmin + 1 [30], [31]. Note, that an MRD code is also an
MDS array code.
Let x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xk] ∈ Fαkq be an information vector,
xi ∈ F
α
q is a block of size α, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. These k blocks
are encoded into n encoded blocks yi ∈ Fαq , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, stored
in n nodes of size α, in the following way:
y = xG,
where y = [y1,y2, . . . ,yn] and the generator matrix G is an
k × n block matrix with blocks of size α× α given by:
G =


A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,n
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ak,1 Ak,2 . . . Ak,n

 .
An array code C has an MDS property if any blocks sub
matrix of G of size k × k is of the full rank. In other words,
if an (n, k) MDS code is used to store data in a system, and
any set of n− k storage nodes fails, the original data can be
recovered from the k surviving nodes.
We say that an MDS code satisfies optimal repair property,
if a single failed node can be repaired by downloading αd/(d−
k+1) elements from every node of any d-subset of surviving
nodes [1].
1) Examples of Optimal Repair MDS Array Codes: In the
following, we present two examples of the optimal repair MDS
array codes for DSS, which we will use further for illustration
of our coding scheme. Due to space constraints, we only
describe the MDS codes used in the examples. For general
constructions, interested readers may refer to the respective
papers that present these codes.
c12
c1
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
c2
c3
c4 c8
c7
c5 c9
c11
c4 + c8 + c12
c3 + c7 + c11
c2 + c6 + c10
c1 + c5 + c9 c1 + 2c7 + 2c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
c10c6
(a)
c2 + e2
c1 + 2c7 + 2c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
y2 y3 y4 y5y1
c1 + e1
c3 + e3
c4 + e4 c4 + c8 + c12
c3 + c7 + c11
c2 + c6 + c10
c1 + c5 + c9c9
c11
c12c8 − 2
−1e2
c7 − 2
−1e1
c5 − e1
c10c6 − e2
(b)
Fig. 1: Illustration of the second node repair process in (5, 3) Zigzag code: (a) for error free system, (b) for system with
erroneous information at the first storage node.
Example 1: (5,3) Zigzag code [8]. This class of MDS array
codes [8] is based on generalized permutation matrices. For
the (5, 3) Zigzag code presented in Fig. 1, the first three nodes
are systematic nodes which store the data [c1, c2, . . . , c12], with
α = 4. The block generator matrix for this code is given by
G =


I 0 0 I I
0 I 0 I A2
0 0 I I A3

 ,
A2 =


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0

 , A3 =


0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 2
0 0 1 0

 ,
where I and 0 denote the identity matrix and all-zero matrix,
respectively. Fig. 1a describes node repair process for (5, 3)
Zigzag code. When the second node fails, the newcomer
node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the
surviving nodes.
Example 2: (5, 3) Hadamard Design codes [6]. This class of
MDS array codes employs interference alignment strategies in
order to perform node repair. In the (5, 3) example presented in
Fig. 2, the first three nodes are systematic nodes which store
the data, yi = [c(i−1)α+1, . . . , ciα], 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The block
generator matrix for a (5, 3) Hadamard design based code is
given by
G =


I 0 0 I A1,5
0 I 0 I A2,5
0 0 I I A3,5

 ,
where ATi,5 = aiXi + biX4 + I , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, Xi =
I2i−1 ⊗ blkdiag
(
I α
2i
,−I α
2i
)
, α = 24, and ai and bi ∈ Fq
satisfy a2i − b2i = −1. The process of the second node repair
is illustrated in Fig. 2a. During this process, the newcomer
downloads y4V and y5V from node 4 and 5, respectively
(see D1 in Fig. 2a). The newcomer uses V̂ and V˜ as repair
matrices corresponding to node 1 and 3, respectively, where V̂
and V˜ are some basis for the column-space of [V A1,5V ] and
[V A3,5V ], respectively. The information downloaded from
node 1 and 3 is used to cancel the interference terms (contri-
bution of y1 and y3 in D1). After interference mitigation, a
linear system of equations is solved to get y2.
III. CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR STATIC ERROR MODEL
In this section we present our coding scheme and prove its
error tolerance under the static error model. We illustrate the
idea by using examples from Sec. II-C1 and prove that this
construction is optimal for the static error model.
A. The Construction
Let M ∈ FKNq denote a file of size M = KN , K < N .
M is partitioned into K parts of size N each. We form an
N ×K matrix M over Fq, where an ith part of M forms an
ith column of M, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K . Let C be an [N×m, ̺ =
NK, δ = m − K + 1] Gabidulin MRD code, with m ≤ N .
Let cM ∈ FmqN be the codeword in C which corresponds to the
information matrix M. Let α, k be positive integers such that
m = αk and let Q = qN . Let C be an (n, k) optimal repair
MDS array code of dimensions α×n. We partition the vector
cM into k parts of size α and form n nodes of size α each,
according to the encoding algorithm of the code C. Note, that
we use an MDS array code over Fq ⊆ FqN = FQ, i.e., its
generator matrix is over Fq , and during the process of node
repair, a set of surviving nodes transmits linear combinations
of the stored elements with the coefficients from Fq.
The following theorem shows that if 2tα+1 ≤ δ the system
tolerates up to t erroneous nodes.
Theorem 1: Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the
system based on concatenated MRD and optimal repair MDS
array codes. If 2tα + 1 ≤ δ, then the original data can be
recovered from any k nodes.
Proof: Let cM ∈ FmQ be the codeword in C which corre-
sponds to an information matrix M, and let [x1,x2, . . . ,xk],
xi ∈ F
α
Q, be the partition of cM into k parts of size α each.
Let [y1,y2, . . . ,yn], yi ∈ FαQ be the encoded blocks stored in
n nodes.
Let S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} be the set of indices of the
erroneous nodes. Hence the ij th node, ij ∈ S, contains∑k
ℓ=1 xℓAℓ,ij + e
ij
, where eij = [eij1 , e
ij
2 , . . . , e
ij
α ] ∈ FαQ
denotes an adversarial error introduced by the ij th node.
When the failed nodes are being repaired, the errors from
adversarial nodes propagate to the repaired nodes. In particular,
ℓth node, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, contains
∑k
j=1 xjAj,ℓ +
∑t
j=1 e
ijB
ij
ℓ ,
where Bijℓ ∈ Fα×αq represents the propagation of error eij
and depends on the specific choice of an MDS array code.
Suppose a data collector contacts a subset D with k nodes and
downloads
∑k
j=1 xjAj,i +
∑t
j=1 e
ijB
ij
i from any ith node,
i ∈ D. If these k nodes are all systematic nodes, then we
obtain [x1,x2, . . . ,xk]+ eB, where B is the blocks matrix of
size tα× kα over Fq given by
B =


B
i1
1 B
i1
2 . . . B
i1
k
B
i2
1 B
i2
2 . . . B
i2
k
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bit1 B
it
2 . . . B
it
k


and e = [ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eit ]. Otherwise, we obtain
[x1,x2, . . . ,xk] + eB
′
, where the block matrix B′ ∈ Ftα×kαq
represents the coefficients of e obtained by the decoding of
the code C. Since the rank of e over Fq is at most tα, and
δ ≥ 2tα+ 1, the MRD code C can correct this error.
B. Examples
In this subsection we illustrate the idea of the construction
for the case where an adversary pollutes the information stored
on a single storage node. We demonstrate that the rank of the
error introduced by an adversary does not increase due to node
repair dynamics under the static error model. Hence, a data
collector can recover the correct original information using a
decoder for an MRD code. It is important to note that in our
construction, any optimal repair MDS array code from DSS
literature can be used as the inner code. In this subsection,
we illustrate the idea of our construction with the help of two
examples drawn from two different classes of optimal repair
MDS array codes for DSS, presented in Section II-C1.
Example 3: Let C be the (5,3) Zigzag code from Ex-
ample 1. Its first three systematic nodes store a codeword
c = [c1, c2, . . . , c12] ∈ F
12
Q , Q = q
N
, from Gabidulin
MRD code, which is obtained by encoding the original data.
The content stored in ith systematic node, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
is yi = [c(i−1)α+1, . . . , ciα] ∈ FαQ. Note that α = 4
in this example. Let us assume that an adversary attacks
the first storage node and introduces erroneous information.
The erroneous information at the first node can be modeled
as y1 + e = [c1, c2, c3, c4] + [e1, e2, e3, e4]. Now assume
that the second node fails. The system is oblivious to the
presence of pollution at the first node, and employs an exact
regeneration strategy to reconstruct the second node. The
reconstructed node downloads the symbols from the shaded
locations at the surviving nodes, as described in Fig. 1b, and
solves a linear system of equations to obtain [c5, c6, c7, c8] +
[−e1,−e2,−2
−1e1,−2
−1e2], where 2−1 denotes the inverse
element of 2 in Fq , q ≥ 3. Now assume that a data collector ac-
cesses the first three nodes in an attempt to recover the original
data. The data collector now has access to c˜ = c+e[I, B2, 0],
where
B2 =


−1 0 −2
−1
0
0 −1 0 −2
−1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 . (3)
Note that c˜ contains an error of rank at most four. Therefore,
the original MRD codeword c and subsequently the original
information can be recovered, using an MRD code with rank
distance at least nine.
Example 4: Let C be a (5,3) Hadamard design based
code, described in Example 2. Its first three nodes store
yi = [c(i−1)α+1, . . . , ciα] ∈ F
α
Q, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, where
c = [c1, c2, . . . , c3α] ∈ F
3α
Q is a codeword of a Gabidulin MRD
code, which is obtained by encoding the original data. Suppose
an adversary modifies the information stored at the first node
to y1 + e = [c1, . . . , cα] + [e1, . . . , eα]. When the second
node fails, a newcomer, unaware of the presence of error
at the first node, employs the interference alignment based
strategy described in Example 2 and depicted in Fig. 2. After
interference mitigation, a linear system of equations is solved
to obtain y2 + eB2. Assuming that a data collector contacts
the first three nodes, it receives [y1, y2, y3] + e[I, B2, 0]
which contains an error of rank at most α. This allows the
recovery of uncorrupted information using an MRD code of
sufficient minimum rank distance.
C. Code Parameters
The upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored
reliably in the general system with t < k2 corrupted nodes,
called resilience capacity and denoted by C(α, β), was pre-
sented by Pawar et al. [12]. This bound is given by
C(α, β) ≤
k∑
i=2t+1
min{(d− i+ 1)β, α}. (4)
The authors in [12] provided the explicit construction of the
codes that attain this bound, for bandwidth-limited regime.
However, this construction has practical limitations for large
values of t since the decoding algorithm presented in [12] is
exponential in t.
Next, we show that our constructed codes attain bound (4)
and thus, are optimal. In addition, the decoding of codewords
in the construction presented in our paper is efficient since it is
based on two efficient decoding algorithms: one, for an MDS
array code, and two, for a Gabidulin code.
Let the parameters K,N,m, δ, α, k, n be as described in
the construction of Section III. Then m = K + δ − 1 and
m = αk. Let t be an integer such that δ = 2tα + 1. Then
αk = K + δ − 1 = K + 2αt, and hence K = α(k − 2t).
Now we compare this result with the bound (4). Let C be
an MDS array code with optimal repair property. Then β =
α
d−k+1 . Therefore, we can rewrite bound (4) as follows:
C(α, β =
α
d− k + 1
) ≤
k∑
i=2t+1
min{(d− i+ 1)
α
d− k + 1
, α} = α(k − 2t).
Thus, the coding scheme proposed in this paper achieves the
bound in (4).
Remark 1: Although the static error model is less general
than the model considered in [12], the upper bound (4) applies
to the static model as well. Pawar et al. [12] obtain this
upper bound by evaluating a cut of the information flow graph
corresponding to a particular node failure sequence, pattern
of nodes under adversarial attack and data collector. This
information flow graph is also valid in the context of the static
error model. Consequently its cut, which provides an upper
bound on the information flow and represents the amount of
data that can be reliably stored on DSS, is correct under the
static model. As shown in this paper, this bound is tight for
y2
y3
y1
y4 =
∑3
i=1 yi
DT2 =
[
V TyT2
V TAT2,5yT2
]
y3V˜
y1V̂
D2
[
V A2,5V
]−1
= y2
y5 =
∑3
i=1 yiAi,5
DT1 =
[
V TyT1 + V TyT2 + V TyT3
V TAT1,5yT1 + V TAT2,5yT2 + V TAT3,5yT3
]
(a)
y1 + e1
y2
y3
y4 =
∑3
i=1 yi D
T
1 =
[
V TyT1 + V TyT2 + V TyT3
V TAT1,5yT1 + V TAT2,5yT2 + V TAT3,5yT3
]
y5 =
∑3
i=1 yiAi,5
D̂T2 =
[
−V TeT1 + V
TyT2
−V TAT1,5e
T
1 + V
TAT2,5yT2
]
y3V˜
(y1 + e1)V̂
D̂2
[
V A2,5V
]−1
= y2 + eB2
(b)
Fig. 2: Illustration of node repair in (5, 3) Hadamard design based codes: (a) in error free system, (b) in the presence of error
at the first storage node.
static model at MSR point, which might not be the case for
the general error model considered in [12].
Remark 2: Recently, Rashmi et al. [13] considered a sce-
nario, referred as ‘erasure’, where some nodes which are
supposed to provide data during node repair become unavail-
able. It is easy to see from (2) that our construction can also
correct such erasures, as long as the minimum distance of the
corresponding MRD code is large enough. The codes obtained
by our construction also attain the bound on the capacity
derived in [13]. However, while our construction works with
any MSR code and in particular with an MSR code with high
rate, it provides a solution for a restricted error model.
IV. DYNAMIC ERROR MODEL
In this section, we consider the problem of designing coding
schemes for DSS that work under dynamic error model. In this
attack model, an adversary can have access to at most t storage
nodes throughout the life span of DSS and can potentially send
different data each time a node under its control is meant to
send data during node repair as well as data reconstruction
process.
Note that coding scheme proposed for the static error model
hinges on the fact that each time an attacked node is requested
for the data to be sent, it sends some linear combinations of
the data that has been modified on it by adversary, which the
adversary is allowed to do only once. Therefore, the rank of the
error that a single node under static attack causes, throughout
the operation of DSS, is bounded above by α. This is not the
case under the dynamic error model as a single attacked node
can inject an error of large rank if it is utilized in multiple node
repairs, which may render the data stored on DSS useless.
Towards this model, some results are presented in [12]
and [13]. As we have discussed earlier, the coding scheme
proposed in [12] does not have an efficient decoding during
the data reconstruction process and it works specifically with
bandwidth efficiently repairable codes at MBR point, however
we focus on MSR point in this paper. The coding scheme of
[13] deals with the dynamic error model at MSR point, but
there scheme works only for low rate, i.e., 2k ≤ n + 1. In
coding scheme proposed in [13], an adversarial node does not
inject errors into any other node during node repair, as this
scheme allows newcomer to perform error-free exact repair.
Next, we present two solutions to deal with attack under the
dynamic error model. The first solution aims to correct errors
during the node repair process by using a simple approach,
which is explained in the following subsection. The second
approach to cope with dynamic errors is based on existing
literature on subspace signatures.
A. Naı¨ve Scheme for Dynamic Error Model
In the dynamic error model, where there is no constraint on
an adversarial nodes in terms of the data that it can provide
during node repair as well as data reconstruction, one solution
might be to design coding schemes that correct errors while
node repair. One such scheme is proposed in [13] for low rate
codes, where a newcomer node utilizes the redundancy in the
downloaded data to perform correct exact repair even in the
presence of errors in the downloaded data. Next, we analyze
the maximum amount of information that can be stored on the
DSS employing concatenated codes proposed in Section III
under the dynamic error model, if an error free node repair
needs to be performed.
When a storage node fails, a newcomer node downloads dβ
symbols from any d surviving nodes (d ≥ k). Since there can
be at most t adversarial nodes present in the system, the new-
comer node receives at most tβ erroneous symbols. Therefore,
out of kα symbols of an MRD codeword, by (1) the newcomer
has (k−1)β+α symbols (using the fact that the inner code is
an MDS code and we perform bandwidth efficient repair). All
the other kα− (k− 1)β −α = (α− β)(k− 1) symbols of an
MRD codeword can be considered as the erased symbols. Let
ℓ denote the number of information symbols (over FqN ) that
are stored on the DSS. Then the minimum distance δ of the
corresponding MRD code satisfies δ = kα− ℓ+ 1. Therefore
we can reconstruct the entire MRD codeword and thus the data
stored on the failed node, if we have
δ = kα− ℓ+ 1 ≥ 2tβ + (k − 1)(α− β) + 1.
This gives us
ℓ ≤ α+ (k − 2t− 1)β. (5)
Note that the bound in (4) is still applicable. For k = 2t+ 1,
the right hand side expression in (5) is equal to that in (4).
Therefore, this naı¨ve repair scheme is optimal in terms of the
capacity of DSS even in the dynamic error model. However,
the difference between these bounds is monotonically increas-
ing with (k− 2t− 1) and the solution proposed in this section
is suboptimal for general values of system parameters k and t.
B. Subspace Signatures Approach
As mentioned previously, in dynamic error model an at-
tacked node can inject a high rank error. Thus, it is desirable
to restrict the rank of the aggregate error that a particular
attacked node can cause in the entire system under dynamic
error model. In this subsection, we propose to combine the
existing literature on detecting subspace pollution with MRD
codes to counter a dynamic attack. Next, we illustrate this with
the help of subspace signatures proposed in [15].
Let us consider an n-nodes DSS, which employs an MRD
and a bandwidth efficiently repairable code based storage
scheme as explained in Section III. For a node i, content stored
on it, i.e. yi can be viewed as an N×α matrix over Fq. These
α vectors of length N stored on ith node span a subspace
(column space of yi when viewed as a matrix over Fq) in FNq
of rank at most α. Since all elements of coding matrix and
repair matrices are from Fq, β linear combinations sent by
node i for a node repair yiV are nothing but, β vectors that
lie in the subspace spanned by yi. If we make sure that even
under dynamic error model an attacked node sends vectors
from the same α-dimensional subspace of FNq during node
repair and data construction, a data collector encounters at
most tα-rank error, which can be corrected with an MRD code
of large enough rank distance as in the static model. Subspace
signatures solve this problem of enforcing a node to send data
(vectors) from the same α-rank subspace of FNq .
At the beginning, when data is encoded to be stored on a
DSS, system administrator also generates subspace signatures
for data stored on each node according to the procedure
explained in [15]. We assume existence of a trusted verifier,
who stores all n subspace signatures, one signature for each
storage node. Whenever a particular node sends data during
node repair or data reconstruction, the truster verifier checks
the data against the stored subspace signature corresponding
to that particular storage node.
For the purpose of data reconstruction, whenever a node
does not pass the signature test, that node is considered an rank
erasure. If s ≤ t nodes fail the test during data reconstruction,
the data collector deals with sα rank erasures and (t − s)α
rank errors. This bound on the rank of the error that the data
collector encounters is explained in the following paragraph.
Given that the outer MRD code has minimum rank distance
2tα + 1 ≥ 2(t − s)α + sα + 1, the original data can be
reconstructed without an error.
Next, we argue how subspace signatures help restrict rank of
the error introduced in the system by adversarial nodes under
dynamic error model. Assume that node i fails. Let Ri ⊆
{1, . . . , n}\{i} denote the set of d surviving nodes that are
contacted to repair node i. In order to repair node i, each
node j ∈ Ri is supposed to send yjVji, where Vji is an α×β
repair matrix of node i associated with node j. Since the data
downloaded through all the surviving nodes is verified against
subspace signatures, data from node j passes the test if it is
of the form yj V̂ji, where V̂ji is an α× β matrix, which may
be different form Vji. Note that yj V̂ji is in the column space
of yj .
If any of the surviving nodes does not pass the test, the
trusted verifier begins the naı¨ve repair for the failed node and
the nodes that fail the test. During this naı¨ve repair, entire data
is downloaded from a set of k − s nodes out of d − s nodes
that provide data for node repair in the first place and pass
the subspace test. Here s is the number of nodes that fail the
subspace test. Note that each node of these k − s selected
nodes provides additional α−β symbols as it has already sent
β symbols (over FNq ). The decoding algorithm for MRD codes
is run on (k−s)α symbols downloaded from the selected set of
k−s nodes. There can be at most t−s adversary nodes present
in the selected set of k−s nodes (s adversarial nodes that failed
the subspace test are excluded from this process), which can
contribute at most (t− s)α erroneous symbols. Since the rank
distance of the MRD code is greater than 2(t− s)α+ sα+1,
the decoding algorithm recovers the original file, which is used
to get the data that is supposed to be stored on nodes being
repaired.
In case when all the adversarial nodes pass the test, the data
provided by each node j ∈ Ri is of the form
yj V̂ji = yjVji + yj(V̂ji − Vji)
After performing exact repair process for node i, node i stores
yi + yeBi, where Bi is an tα× α matrix over Fq and ye =
[yi1 , . . . ,yit ]. Here {i1, . . . , it} denotes the set of t adversarial
nodes. After the node repair, the trusted verifier generates a
new subspace signature corresponding to the data stored on a
node i for future verification. At any point of time, the data
stored on DSS can be represented as
y˜ = y + yeB, (6)
where an ith column of B is equal to Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is
evident from (6) that the rank of the aggregate error in the
system is at most tα and an MRD code with large enough
minimum distance can ensure the reliable recovery of the
original data.
The idea of using hash functions to provide tolerance against
adversarial errors in DSS has previously been presented in
[10]. However, the error tolerance scheme of [10] involves
periodic verification of the data stored in the system which
may not be practical.
V. ERROR RESILIENCE FOR LOCALLY REPAIRABLE CODES
In this section we consider a special case where α = β = 1
and each node can be repaired by accessing at most r < k other
nodes, where r is called locality. Note that in this scenario
there exist r nodes for repair of a single node, and not every
set of r nodes can be used for a node repair. Such codes were
considered in [16], [17], [19], [20]. Clearly, such codes do not
have an MDS property, but they have a small repair bandwidth.
It is proved [16] that the minimum distance of such a code
satisfies
dmin ≤ n− k + 2−
⌈
k
r
⌉
. (7)
An explicit construction of codes which attain this bound with
systematic locality is presented in [16], [18]. However an
explicit construction for codes that attain this bound and have
all symbols locality is only known for n = ⌈k
r
⌉(r + 1) [19].
In what follows we show a new construction of codes with all
symbols locality which attain bound (7) and can also correct
static errors. This construction is also based on MRD codes.
A. Construction for Optimal Locally Repairable Codes
Let C be an [N ×m,Nk, δ = m− k + 1] Gabidulin MRD
code, where each codeword is considered as a vector of length
m over FqN , and let r be the given locality. Each symbol of an
MRD codeword will be stored in a new node. We consider two
cases: m ≡ 0(mod r) and m ≡ k ≡ j(mod r), for 1 ≤ j < r.
In the first case we partition the set of m coordinates into m
r
disjoint groups Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ mr , of size r, and in the second
case we partition the set of m coordinates into
⌊
m
r
⌋
disjoint
groups Gi of size r and one additional group Ĝ of size j. For
each group Gi we add a new parity node pi to be the sum of
all the r symbols in the same group. For the group Ĝ the new
parity symbol p̂ is equal to the sum of the j elements of Ĝ.
We denote by C loc the constructed code.
Example 5: Let m = N = 8, k = 6, δ = 3 r = 4, and c =
[c1, c2, . . . , c8] be a codeword of an [8×8, 8 ·6, 3] MRD code,
ci ∈ Fq8 . Then the corresponding codeword of C loc is equal
to cloc = [c1, c2, . . . , c8, p1, p2], where p1 = c1 + c2 + c3 + c4,
and p2 = c5 + c6 + c7 + c8.
Theorem 2: A code C loc attains bound (7), i.e., it is an
[n, k, dmin] code with dmin = n− k + 2− ⌈kr ⌉.
Proof: As it was mentioned in Section II, a codeword
of a Gabidulin code can be considered as an evaluation of a
linearized polynomial f(x) ∈ FqN [x] on the set of m linearly
independent points over Fq, {g1, . . . , gm}. Note that for the
reconstruction the original data we need at least k values
f(a1), . . . , f(ak), such that a1, . . . , ak ∈ FqN are linearly
independent over Fq [17]. By the linearity of f(x) we have
that for any group G 6= Ĝ, the new parity pi is equal to
f(gi1 + gi2 + . . . + gir ), for is ∈ G, and for Ĝ we have
p̂ = f(gi1 +gi2 + . . .+gij ), for is ∈ Ĝ. Hence, any r symbols
in Gi∪{pi} are the evaluation of f(x) in r linearly independent
points. Now we distinguish between two cases.
Case 1, m ≡ 0(mod r): In this case, n = m+ m
r
. Let i and
j be two integers such that k = m−r(i+1)+j, 0 ≤ i ≤ m
r
−1,
and 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1. Then m
r
−
⌈
k
r
⌉
= i, and according to
bound (7), dmin−1 ≤ m+mr −r(mr −(i+1))−j−
⌈
k
r
⌉
+1 =
r(i + 1) − j + i + 1 = (r + 1)(i + 1) − j. We will prove
that any (r + 1)(i + 1)− j erasures can be corrected by this
code. In other words, after this number of erasures we still
have an evaluation of f(x) in k linearly independent points.
Note that the worst case is when the erasures appear in the
smallest possible number of groups and when the number of
erasures inside a group is maximal. So we consider the case
when all the symbols in i groups are erased, and there is a
group with r+1−j erasures. Then the number of the remaining
symbols which correspond to linearly independent points is
m− ri − (r − j) = k.
Case 2, m ≡ k ≡ j(mod r): for 1 ≤ j < r. In this case,
n = m +
⌈
m
r
⌉
. Let i be an integer such that k = ir + j,
0 ≤ i ≤ ⌊m
r
⌋. Since m =
⌊
m
r
⌋
r+j, then by bound (7), dmin−
1 ≤ (
⌊
m
r
⌋
r+ j+
⌊
m
r
⌋
+1)− (ir+ j)+1− (i+1) = (
⌊
m
r
⌋
−
i)(r + 1) + 1. As in the previous case, we consider the worst
case for erasures, when all the symbols in (
⌊
m
r
⌋
− i) groups
and one additional symbol are erased. Then the number of the
remaining symbols which correspond to linearly independent
points is m− (
⌊
m
r
⌋
− i)r = j + ir = k.
Example 6: In this example, we prove that the code from
Example 5 has minimum distance 4, in other words, this code
can tolerate any three erasures.
• any 2 erasures can be corrected by the MRD code, since
its minimum rank distance is 3.
• if two erasures are in the same group and additional one
erasure in another group, then we still have the values
of the corresponding linearized polynomial f(x) in the
3 + 4 = 7 linearly independent points,
• if all three erasures are in the same group, then we have
values of f(x) in 2 + 4 = 6 linearly independent points.
In all the cases, since k = 6, we can correct these erasures.
Note that if there is an adversarial node in such a system,
then the erroneous data spreads into the whole group contain-
ing this node because of the node repair property, in other
words, the Hamming weight of an error is equal to the size of
a group. However, the rank of such an error is one, and it can
be corrected by an MRD code with δ ≥ 3. We generalize this
property of a code C loc in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If the related to C loc MRD code C has mini-
mum rank distance δ ≥ 2t+ 1 then C loc can tolerate at most
t static errors.
Example 7: Consider the code from Example 5, and let
t = 1. Its rank distance is 3, and the Hamming distance is
4. Since the group size is 5, by using only Hamming metric
it is impossible to correct this error, however, by applying a
decoding of MRD code we can correct it.
Remark 3: The construction proposed in this section can be
seen as a particular case of the construction of self-repairing
homomorphic codes [17], since it can also be described in
terms of linearized polynomials. In addition, this construction
is closely related to construction of pyramid codes [18], and
the construction given in [19], since an MRD code can be also
seen as an MDS code over an extension field.
VI. CONCLUSION
A novel concatenated coding scheme for distributed storage
system was presented. The scheme makes use of rank-metric
codes, in particular, MRD codes as the first step of encoding
the data. In the second step of encoding MDS optimal repair
array codes or locally repairable codes are used. This construc-
tion provides resilience against static adversarial errors. More-
over, when using MDS optimal repair array codes this scheme
is optimal in terms of the resilience capacity, and when using
locally repairable codes this scheme is optimal in terms of the
minimum distance. A modification of the scheme based on
subspace signatures provides resilience against dynamic errors.
The resilience of this scheme against a passive eavesdropper
is a subject of our current research [32].
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